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Abstract
We present novel homomorphic encryption schemes for integer arithmetic, intended for use in secure
single-party computation in the cloud. These schemes are capable of securely computing only low degree
polynomials homomorphically, but this appears sufficient for most practical applications. In this setting,
our schemes lead to practical key and ciphertext sizes. We present a sequence of generalisations of our
basic schemes, with increasing levels of security, but decreasing practicality. We have evaluated the first
four of these algorithms by computing a low-degree inner product. The timings of these computations
are extremely favourable. Finally, we use our ideas to derive a fully homomorphic system, which appears
impractical, but can homomorphically evaluate arbitrary Boolean circuits.
1 Introduction
With services like Amazon’s Elastic MapReduce and Microsoft’s HDInsight offering large-scale distributed
cloud computing environments, computation in the cloud is becoming increasingly more available. Such
services allow for computation on large volumes of data to be performed without the large investment in
local computing resources. However, where the data that is processed is sensitive, such as financial or medical
data, then uploading such data in its raw form to such a third-party service becomes problematic.
To take advantage of these cloud services, we require a means to process the data securely on such a
platform. We designate such a computation, secure computation in the cloud (SCC). SCC should not expose
input or output data to any other party, including the cloud service provider. Furthermore, the details of
the computation should not allow any other party to deduce its inputs and outputs. Cryptography seems
the natural approach to this problem.
However, it should be noted that van Dijk and Juels [21] show that cryptography alone cannot realise
secure multi-party computation in the cloud, where the parties jointly compute a function over their inputs
while keeping their own inputs private. Since our approach is via homomorphic encryption, we will restrict
our attention to what we will call secure single-party computation in the cloud (SSCC).
Homomorphic encryption (HE) seems to offer a solution to the SSCC problem. First defined by Rivest
et al. [43] in 1978, HE allows a function to be computed on encrypted inputs without ever decrypt-
ing the inputs. Suppose we wish to compute the function f on inputs x1, x2, . . . , xn, then, under HE,
Dec(f ′(x′1, x
′
2, . . . , x
′
n)) = f(x1, x2, . . . , xn), where x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n are the encryptions of x1, . . . , xn, f
′ is the
equivalent of f in the ciphertext space, and Dec is the decryption function. One can easily see that HE
would satisfy some of the requirements for secure computation in the cloud. A somewhat HE scheme (SWHE)
is an HE scheme which is HE for only limited imputs and functions.
Fully HE (FHE) is an HE scheme that is homomorphic for all f . This was first realised by Gentry in
2009 [24], and appears to be the ideal HE scheme. However, despite the clear advantages of FHE, and many
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significant advances [10–13], it remains largely impractical. The two implementations of recent FHE schemes,
HELib [29] and FHEW [22], both perform very poorly in comparison with operations on unencrypted data,
in their running time and space requirements. It is reported that a HELib implementation of the AES-128
circuit processed inputs in just over four minutes [30]. Similarly, FHEW processed a single homomorphic
NAND operation followed by a re-encryption in 0.69s and using 2.2GB of RAM. The paper [36] attempted
to assess the practicality of one of the underlying SWHE schemes[12], but with no positive conclusion.
Therefore, we take the view in this paper that only SWHE is currently of practical interest. Our goal
is to develop new SWHE schemes which are practically useful, and which we have implemented, though we
conclude the paper by showing that our ideas can be used to develop a (fairly impractical) FHE scheme.
1.1 Scenario
As introduced above, our work concerns secure single-party computation in the cloud. In our scenario, a
secure client wishes to compute a function on a large volume of data. This function could be searching
or sorting the data, computing an arithmetic function of numeric data, or any other operation. For the
most part, we consider here the case where the client wishes to perform arithmetic computations on numeric
data. This data might be the numeric fields within a record, and the non-numeric fields would be treated
differently.
The client delegates the computation to the cloud. However, while the data is in the cloud, it could be
subject to snooping, including by the cloud provider. The client does not wish to expose the input data,
or the output of the computation, to possible snooping in the cloud. A snooper here will be a party who
may observe the data and the computation in the cloud, but cannot, or does not, change the data or insert
spurious data. (In our setting data modification would amount to pointless vandalism.) The snooping could
be casual, simply displaying an uninvited interest, or malicious, intending to use the data for the attacker’s
own purposes.
To obtain the required data privacy, the client’s function will be computed homomorphically, on an
encrypted version of the data. The client encrypts the source data using a secret key and uploads the
encrypted data to the cloud, along with a homomorphic equivalent of the target computation. The cloud
environment performs the homomorphic computation on the encrypted data. The result of the homomorphic
computation is then returned to the client, who decrypts it using the secret key, and obtains the output of
the original computation.
In this scenario, we observe that the source data is never exposed in the cloud, but encryptions of the
source data are. A snooper may observe the computation of the equivalent homomorphic function in the
cloud environment. As a result, they may be able to deduce what operations are performed on the data,
even though they do not know the inputs. A snooper may also be able to inspect the (encrypted) working
data generated by the cloud computation, and even perform side computations of their own on this data.
However, snoopers have no access to the secret key, so cannot make encryptions of their own to deduce the
secret key.
1.2 Definitions and Notation
x
$←− S denotes a value x chosen uniformly at random from the discrete set S.
KeyGen : S → K denotes the key generation function operating on the security parameter space S and
whose range is the secret key space K.
Enc : M×K → C denotes the symmetric encryption function operating on the plaintext space M and
the secret key space K and whose range is the ciphertext space C.
Dec : C × K → M denotes the symmetric decryption function operating on the ciphertext space C and
the secret key space K and whose range is the plaintext space M.
Add : C × C → C denotes the homomorphic addition function whose domain is C2 and whose range is C.
Mult : C × C → C denotes the homomorphic mutliplication function whose domain is C2 and whose range
is C.
m,m1,m2, . . . denote plaintext values. Similarly, c, c1, c2, . . . denote ciphertext values.
If k∗ =
(
k+1
2
)
, v⋆ = [v1 v2 . . . vk∗ ]
T denotes a k∗-vector which augments the k-vector v = [v1 v2 . . . vk]
T
by appending elements vi = fi(v1, . . . , vk) (i ∈ [k + 1, k∗]), for a linear function fi. (All vectors are column
2
vectors throughout.)
ei denotes the ith unit vector (i = 1, 2, . . .), with size determined by the context.
[x, y] denotes the integers between x and y inclusive.
[x, y) denotes [x, y] \ {y}.
log denotes loge and lg denotes log2.
If λ is a security parameter, “with high probability” will mean with probability 1−2−ǫλ, for some constant
ǫ > 0.
Polynomial time or space means time or space polynomial in the security parameter λ.
An arithmetic circuit Φ over the ring R in variables X = {x1, . . . , xn} is a directed acyclic graph with
every vertex (gate) having in-degree either two or zero. Every vertex of in-degree 0 is labelled either by a
variable in X or by an element of R. Each other vertex in Φ has in-degree two and is labelled by either ×
or +. Every vertex of out-degree 0 in Φ computes a polynomial in R[X ] in the obvious manner. We refer to
the directed edges in the acyclic graph as wires. The depth of Φ is the length of the longest directed path in
it. (See [32].)
A Boolean circuit Φ is defined similarly to an arithmetic circuit. Every vertex of in-degree 0 is labelled
either by a variable in X or an element of {0, 1}. Each other vertex in Φ has in-degree two and is labelled
by a binary Boolean function. Then every vertex of out-degree 0 in Φ computes some Boolean function of
the inputs. Note that any finite computation can be represented as a Boolean circuit. (See [49].)
1.3 Formal Model of Scenario
We have n integer inputs m1,m2, . . . ,mn distributed in [0,M) according to a probability distribution D. If
X is a random integer sampled from D, let Pr[X = i] = ξi, for i ∈ [0,M). We will consider three measures
of the entropy of X , measured in bits:
Shannon entropy H1(X) = −
∑M−1
i=0 ξi lg ξi,
Collision entropy H2(X) = − lg
(∑M−1
i=0 ξ
2
i
)
,
Min entropy H∞(X) = − lg
(
maxM−1i=0 ξi
)
.
It is known that H1(X) ≥ H2(X) ≥ H∞(X), with equality if and only if X has the uniform distribution on
[0,M), in which case all three are lgM . We will denote H∞(X) by ρ, so it also follows that H1(X), H2(X) ≥
ρ. We use the term “entropy” without qualification to mean min entropy, H∞(X). Note that H∞(X) = ρ ≥
lgM implies ξi ≤ 2−ρ, i ∈ [0,M), and that M ≥ 2ρ.
We wish to compute a polynomial P of degree d on these inputs. A secure client A selects an instance
EK of the encryption algorithm E using the secret parameter set K. A encrypts the n inputs by computing
ci = EK(mi), for i ∈ [1, n]. A uploads c1, c2, . . . , cn and P ′ to the cloud computing environment, where P ′
is the homomorphic equivalent of P in the ciphertext space. The cloud computing environment computes
P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn). A retrieves P
′(c1, c2, . . . , cn) from the cloud, and computes
P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) = EK−1(P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn)).
A snooper is only able to inspect c1, c2, . . . , cn, the function P
′, the computation of P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn),
including subcomputations and working data, and P ′(c1, c2, . . . , cn) itself.
Our encryption schemes are essentially symmetric key encryption, though there is no key distribution
problem. The public parameters of our schemes are exposed to the cloud, but they do not provide an
encryption oracle.
This model is clearly susceptible to certain attacks. We consider ciphertext only, brute force, and crypt-
analytic attacks. To avoid cryptanalytic attacks, we must choose the parameters of the system carefully.
Here, a brute force attack will mean guessing the plaintext associated with a ciphertext. In our encryption
schemes, it will be true that a guess can be verified. Since ξi ≤ 2−ρ for i ∈ [0,M), the expected number µ
of guesses before making a correct guess satisfies µ ≥ 2ρ. Massey [37] gave a corresponding result in terms
of the Shannon entropy H1(X).
It follows similarly that the probability of any correct guess in 2ρ/2 guesses is at most 2−ρ/2. This bound
holds if we need only to guess any one of n inputs, m1,m2, . . . ,mn, even if these inputs are not independent.
Therefore, if ρ is large enough, a brute force attack is infeasible.
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Recall that, in our model, known plaintext attack (KPA) is possible only by brute force, and not through
being given a sample of plaintext, ciphertext pairs.
We do not regard chosen plaintext attack (CPA) or chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) as being relevant
to our model. Since EK is never exposed in the cloud, there is no realistic analogue of an encryption or
decryption oracle, as required by these attacks. Of course, in public key encryption, an encryption algorithm
is publicly available as part of the system, so CPA must be forestalled. We note that, following [4], it is
common in studying symmetric key encryption to suppose that defence to CPA or CCA is necessary. While
this may provide a stronger notion of security, it seems hard to justify. Both [3] and [8] provide examples
which are intended to justify this convention. However, these examples are unconvincing, and seem to have
little practical importance. Nevertheless, since it is not difficult to do so, we show that the “N” variants of
our HE schemes below resist CPA.
We note that observation of the function P ′, which closely resembles P , might leak some information
about its inputs. However, we assume that this information is far too weak to threaten the security of the
system. This assumption seems universal in the existing literature on HE. However, “garbled circuits” [5,
25] are a possible solution to this problem, if the threat is significant.
Finally, we note that our model of SSCC is very similar to the model of private single-client computing,
presented in [21] along with an example application.
1.4 Our Results
We describe novel practical HE schemes for the encryption of integers, to be employed in a SSCC system
inspired by CryptDB [40]. CryptDB is an HE scheme where encryption depends on the operation to be
performed. CryptDB encrypts integers using the Paillier cryptosystem [39] which allows for homomorphic
addition. Similar systems ([46, 47]) use Paillier and ElGamal [23] to support addition and multiplication,
respectively. The “unpadded” versions of these schemes are used, which may not be secure under CPA [26],
reducing any possible advantage of a public-key system. However, these schemes do not support both
addition and multiplication. To perform an inner product, say, requires re-encrypting the data once the
multiplications have been performed so that the additions can then be performed. In a SSCC system, this
would require shipping the data back to the initiator for re-encryption, creating a significant overhead. To
avoid this problem, we aim for an HE scheme for integers supporting both addition and multiplication.
Our HE scheme over the integers is inspired by the SWHE scheme of van Dijk et al. [20] (which we
denote DGHVS) that is used as the basis for their public-key system (denoted as DGHV in [18]). As in their
system, we add multiples of integers to the plaintext to produce a ciphertext. However, DGHVS supports
only arithmetic mod 2, and we generalise this to larger moduli.
In the section above, we showed that the input data must have sufficient entropy to negate brute force
attacks. If the data lacks sufficient entropy, we will introduce more entropy in two ways. The first is to add
random “noise” of sufficient entropy to the ciphertext to “mask” the plaintext. This approach is employed
in DGHV and in sections 2.2 and 3.2. In our schemes we add a random multiple (from 0 to κ) of a large
integer, κ, to the ciphertext, such that mi < κ, for all i ∈ [1, N ]. If the entropy of the original data was ρ,
once transformed it is ρ + lg κ. Therefore, if κ is large enough we can ensure that our data has sufficient
entropy. However, there is a downside. To prevent the noise term growing so large that the cipherext can
no longer be decrypted successfully, we are restricted to computing polynomials of low enough degree.
The other technique will be to increase the dimension of the ciphertext. We represent the ciphertext as a
k-vector, where each element is a linear function of the plaintext as in DGHVS. Addition and multiplication
of ciphertexts are simple transformations of the ciphertexts using vector and matrix algebra. The basic case
k = 1 is described in section 2.1. Then we can increase the entropy k-fold by creating a k-vector ciphertext.
This is because we need to guess k plaintexts to successfully break the system. Assuming that the inputs
m1,m2, . . . ,mn are chosen independently from D, and the entropy of inputs is ρ, then the entropy of a
k-tuple (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) is kρ. Thus the k-vectors effectively have entropy kρ. If k is chosen large enough,
there will be sufficient entropy to prevent brute force attack. Note that the assumption of independence
among m1,m2, . . . ,mn can easily be relaxed, to allow some correlation, but we will not discuss the details
here. The upside is that some cryptanalytic methods applicable in the case k = 1 do not seem to generalise
even to k = 2. The downside is that ciphertexts are k times larger, and each homomorphic multiplication
requires Ω(k3) time and space, in comparison with the case k = 1. For very large k, this probably renders the
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methods impractical. Therefore, we consider the case k = 2 in some detail in section 3.1, before describing
the general case in section 4.1.
Our work here only aims to support integer arithmetic. Other operations, like sorting, require different
HE schemes, which we will consider elsewhere. In the integer arithmetic case, a system for computing low-
degree polynomials seems to suffice for most practical applications. (See [36]). To this end, we will consider
practically implementable values for the parameters of the cryptosystems.
1.5 Related Work
FHE schemes start by devising a SWHE scheme which supports only homomorphic addition and multiplic-
ation, so the computation is to evaluate an arithmetic circuit on encryptions to which random “noise” has
been edded. A general computation is represented as an arithmetised Boolean circuit [2]. As ciphertexts
are added and multiplied during the computation, the “noise” grows until there comes a point where the
plaintext cannot be uniquely recovered from the ciphertext. Therefore the arithmetic circuit must be of
limited depth, to prevent this “noise” growing too large. If the circuit is sufficiently shallow, this SWHE
scheme can be used in its own right, e.g. Boneh et al. [9].
The SWHE system is transformed into an FHE scheme by a process of re-encryption where, once the
noise grows too large, the ciphertext is re-encrypted, thereby allowing computation to proceed. This re-
encryption is performed homomorphically, using a circuit shallow enough that the noise does not grow too
large. This circuit necessarily contains information about the private key, which must be suitably hidden.
This re-encryption reduces the noise in the ciphertext, and allows circuits of arbitrary depth to be computed
homomorphically.
Our scheme is inspired by that of van Dijk et al. [20]. In their paper they produce an FHE scheme
over the integers, where a simple SWHE scheme is “bootstrapped” to FHE. van Dijk et al. take a simple
symmetric scheme where an plaintext bit m is encrypted as c = m + 2r + pq, where the secret key p is an
odd η-bit integer from the interval [2η−1, 2η), and r and q are integers chosen randomly from an interval
such that 2r < p/2. The ciphertext c is decrypted by the calculation (c mod p) mod 2. Our scheme HE1N
below may be regarded as a generalisation of this.
van Dijk et al. transform their symmetric scheme into a public key scheme. A public key 〈x0, x1, . . . , xτ 〉
is constructed where each xi is a near multiple of p of the form pq + r where q and r are random integers
chosen from a prescribed interval. To encrypt a message a subset S of xi from the public key are chosen and
the ciphertext is calculated as c = m + 2r + 2
∑
i∈S xi mod x0. The ciphertext is decrypted as previously
described. We could extend our HEkN schemes here to a public key variant, using a similar device. However,
we will not do so, since public key systems appear to have little application to our model.
van Dijk et al. “bootstrap” their public key system to an FHE scheme, using Gentry’s approach [24].
In this case, the bootstrapping is done by homomorphically simulating a division by p, thus obtaining an
encryption of c mod p which can be used to continue the computation. Our FHE proposal below is based
on different principles.
In [18], Coron et al. reduce the size of the public key by using a similar but alternative encryption scheme.
In this scheme, p is a prime in the specified interval, x0 is an exact multiple of p and the sum term in the
ciphertext is quadratic rather than linear.
The above FHE schemes represent a major theoretical achievement. However, they appear impractical
for computations on large data sets, in terms of both running time and storage requirements.
Therefore, the direction of our work is similar to [36]. The authors implement the SWHE scheme
from [12]. However, they give results only for degree two polynomials. Our schemes seem capable of
computing somewhat higher degree polynomials for practical key and ciphertext sizes.
Recent work on functional encryption [27, 28] should also be noted. While these results are of great
theoretical interest, the scenario where such schemes might be applied is rather different from our model.
Also, the methods of [27, 28] do not seem likely to be of practical interest in the foreseeable future.
The symmetric MORE scheme [34] and its derivative [50] uses linear transformations, as does our scheme
HEk in a different way. These systems have been shown [48] to be insecure against KPA, at least as originally
proposed. However, whether KPA is practically relevant in context is moot.
We also note the work of Cheon et al. [15]. They use the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) in an FHE
system. We make use of the CRT in our scheme HE2NCRT below (section 5). However, our construction
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differs significantly from theirs.
We should note that the encryption of the Boolean circuits in our fully homomorphic system (section 6)
has similarities to Yao’s “garbled circuits” [5, 25].
1.6 Roadmap
We present our initial homomorphic scheme in section 2 in two variants, HE1 and HE1N. HE1 (section
2.1) is suitable for integers distributed with sufficient entropy. HE1N (section 2.2) deals with integers not
distributed with sufficient entropy, by adding an additional “noise” term.
Section 3 describes a further two variants, HE2 and HE2N, which increase the entropy of the plaintext
by adding a dimension to the ciphertexts, which are 2-vectors. Again, HE2 (section 3.1) deals with integers
of sufficient entropy, HE2N (section 3.2) with integers without the required entropy. We describe this in
some detail, since it appears to be practically useful, and is the simplest version of our general scheme.
In section 4, we generalise HE2 and HE2N from 2-vectors to k-vectors, for arbitrary k, in the scheme
HEk, with noisy variant HEkN. These schemes may also be practical for small enough k.
In section 5, we present an extension of HE2N, HE2NCRT, which uses the CRT to distribute the com-
putation.
In section 6, we discuss how HEk can be transformed into an FHE scheme for large enough k, though
the resulting scheme seems only to be of theoretical interest.
In section 7 we describe extensive experimentation with the schemes, and finally, in section 8, we give
our conclusions.
2 Initial Homomorphic Scheme
In this section we present details of our initial SWHE schemes over the integers.
2.1 Sufficient Entropy (HE1)
We have integer inputs m1,m2, . . . ,mn ∈ [0,M). (Negative integers can be handled as in van Dijk et al. [20],
by taking residues in [−(p − 1)/2, (p − 1)/2), rather than [0, p).) We wish to compute a polynomial P of
degree d in these inputs. The inputs are distributed with entropy ρ, where ρ is large enough, as discussed in
section 1.3 above. Our HE scheme is the system (KeyGen,Enc,Dec,Add,Mult).
Let λ be a large enough security parameter, measured in bits. Let p and q be suitably large distinct primes
such that p ∈ [2λ−1, 2λ], and q ∈ [2η−1, 2η], where η ≈ λ2/ρ − λ. Here λ must be large enough to negate
direct factorisation of pq (see [35]), and the relative values of p and q are chosen to negate Coppersmith’s
attack [17]. We will also require p > (n+1)dMd to ensure that P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) < p, so that the result of
the computation can be successfully decrypted. (In many applications, a smaller value of p may suffice). Our
function KeyGen will randomly select p and q according to these bounds. Then p is the private symmetric
key for the system and pq is the modulus for arithmetic performed by Add and Mult. pq is a public parameter
of the system. We assume that the entropy ρ ≫ lg λ, so that a brute force attack cannot be carried out in
polynomial time.
We can easily set the parameters to practical values. If n ≈ √M , M ≈ 2ρ then we may take λ ≈ 3dρ/2
and η ≈ 3dλ/2− λ (see appendix B). For, example, if ρ = 32, d = 4, we can take any λ > 192, η > 960.
We encrypt a plaintext integer m as
Enc(m, p) = m+ rp mod pq
where r
$←− [1, q).
We decrypt the ciphertext c by
Dec(c, p) = c mod p
The sum modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m+ rp and c′ = m′ + r′p, is
Add(c, c′) = c+ c′ mod pq = m+m′ + (r + r′)p.
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This decrypts to m+m′, provided m+m′ < p.
The product modulo pq of two ciphertexts, c = m+ rp and c′ = m′ + r′p, is
Mult(c, c′) = cc′ mod pq
= mm′ + (rm′ + r′m+ rr′p)p,
which decrypts to mm′, provided mm′ < p.
Security of the system is provided by the partial approximate common divisor problem (PACDP), first
posed by Howgrave-Graham [31], but can be formulated [14, 16] as:
Definition 1. (Partial approximate common divisor problem.) Suppose we are given one input x0 = pr0 and
n inputs xi = pri +mi, i ∈ [1, n]. We have a bound B such that |mi| < B for all i. Under what conditions
on the variables, ri and mi, and the bound B, can an algorithm be found that can uniquely determine p in
a time which is polynomial in the total bit length of the numbers involved?
A straightforward attack on this problem is by brute force. Consider x1. Assuming that m1 is sampled
from D, having entropy ρ, we successively try values for m1 and compute gcd(x0, x1 −m1) in polynomial
time until we find a divisor that is large enough to recover p. Then we can recover mi as (xi mod p) for
i ∈ [2, n]. As discussed in section 1.3, the search will requires 2ρ gcd operations in expectation.
Several attempts have been made to solve the PACDP [14, 16, 31], resulting in theoretically faster
algorithms for some cases of the problem. However, our parameters for p and q are chosen to negate the
attacks of [16, 31]. The paper [14] gives an algorithm requiring only
√
M polynomial time operations in the
special case that D is the uniform distribution on [0,M), and hence ρ = lgM . No algorithm running in
time subexponential in ρ is known for this problem in the worst case. Therefore, if ρ is large enough, the
encryption should be secure.
In actuality, our system is a special case of PACDP because we use the residues of the approximate prime
multiples modulo a distinct semiprime modulus. A semiprime is a natural number that is the product of
two prime numbers. A distinct semiprime is a semiprime where the prime factors are distinct. We denote
this case of PACDP as the semiprime partial approximate common divisor problem (SPACDP). Although it
is a restriction, there is no reason to believe that this is any easier than PACDP.
Definition 2. (Semiprime factorisation problem.) Given a semiprime s, the product of primes p and q, can
p and q be determined in polynomial time?
The computational complexity of this problem, which lies at the heart of the widely-used RSA cryptosys-
tem, is open, other than for quantum computing, which currently remains impractical. We will show that
breaking HE1 is equivalent to semiprime factorisation. Therefore, our scheme is at least as secure as unpad-
ded RSA [42].
Theorem 1. An attack against HE1 is successful in polynomial time if and only if we can factorise a distinct
semi-prime in polynomial time.
There is a variant of brute force attack on this system, which we will call a collision attack. Suppose
we have a pair of equal plaintexts m1 = m2. Then the difference between their encryptions (c1 − c2) is an
encryption of 0, and the scheme is subject to KPA. In fact, if we have n plaintexts m1,m2, . . . ,mn, and
there exist i, j ∈ [1, n] with mi = mj , the product Π1≤i<j≤n(cj − ci) is an encryption of 0. However, if there
is sufficient entropy, this attack is not possible.
Lemma 2. If the inputsm have entropy ρ then, for any two independent inputsm1,m2, Pr(m1 = m2) ≤ 2−ρ.
Thus, if we have n inputs, m1,m2, . . . ,mn the probability that there exist i, j ∈ [1, n] with mi = mj is
at most
(
n
2
)
2−ρ. If n < 2−ρ/3, this probability is at most 2−ρ/3, smaller than any inverse polynomial in λ.
Hence, for large enough λ, collision attack is infeasible.
A similar collision attack can be made against the schemes described below. We will not discuss the
details, since they are almost identical to those above.
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2.2 Insufficient Entropy (HE1N)
Suppose now that the integer inputs mi, i ∈ [1, n], are distributed with entropy ρ, where ρ is not large enough
to negate a brute force guessing attack. Therefore, we increase the entropy of the plaintext by adding an
additional “noise” term to the ciphertext. This will be a multiple s (from 0 to κ) of an integer κ, chosen
so that the entropy ρ′ = ρ + lg κ is large enough to negate a brute force guessing attack. We also require
κ > (n+ 1)dMd, so that P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) < κ. As a result of the extra linear term in the ciphertext, we
compute P (m1, . . . ,mn, κ) instead. We can easily retrieve P (m1, . . . ,mn) from P (m1, . . . ,mn, κ). KeyGen
now chooses p and q as in HE1, but with η = λ2/ρ′ − λ, and p > (n+ 1)d(M + κ2)d so that
P (m1 + s1κ,m2 + s2κ, . . . ,mN + snκ) < p,
when s1, s2, . . . , sn ∈ [0, κ). The secret key, sk, is now (κ, p).
We can set these parameters to practical values. If we assume M ≈ 2ρ and large enough n, as in section
2.1, then we may take lg κ > d(lg n + ρ), ρ′ = ρ + lg κ, λ > d(lg n + 2 lg κ). Then, for example, if d = 3,
lg n = 16, ρ = 8, then lg κ > 72, ρ′ = 80, λ > 480, η > 2400. In the extreme case that the inputs are bits, so
ρ = 1, and d = 3, lgn = 16, then we can take lg κ ≈ 51 and ρ′ ≈ 52, and we have λ > 354, η > 2056, which
is only 15% smaller than for ρ = 8.
We encrypt a plaintext, m, as
Enc(m, sk) = m+ sκ+ rp mod pq,
where r
$←− [1, q) and s $←− [0, κ). We decrypt a ciphertext, c, as
Dec(c, sk) = (c mod p) mod κ.
Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts is as above.
The use of random noise gives the encryption the following “indistinguishability” property, which implies
that the system satisfies IND-CPA [4, 6].
Theorem 3. For any encryption c, c mod κ is polynomial time indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
bution on [0, κ). Thus HE1 satisfies IND-CPA, under the assuption that SPACDP is not polynomial time
solvable.
3 Adding a dimension
In this section we discuss adding an additional dimension to the ciphertext, which becomes a 2-vector.
In both schemes presented below, HE2 and HE2N, we add a further vector term, with two further secret
parameters. The two schemes presented below have a constant factor overhead for arithmetic operations. An
addition operation in the plaintext space requires two additions in the ciphertext space, and a multiplication
in the plaintext space requires nine multiplications and four additions in the ciphertext space.
3.1 Sufficient entropy (HE2)
As with HE1, it is assumed that the inputs mi (i ∈ [1, n]) are of sufficient entropy. p and q are chosen by
KeyGen according to the bounds given in section 2.1. KeyGen also sets a = [a1 a2]
T , where ai
$←− [1, pq)
(i ∈ [1, 2]) such that a1, a2, a1 − a2 6= 0 (mod p and mod q). The secret key sk is (p,a) and the public
parameters are pq and R. R is the re-encryption matrix, which is detailed below.
The condition a1, a2, a1−a2 6= 0, ( mod p, mod q) fails with exponentially small probability 3(1/p+1/q).
Thus, a1 and a2 are indistinguishable in polynomial time from a1, a2
$←− [0, pq).
Encryption
We encrypt a plaintext integer m as the 2-vector c,
c = Enc(m, sk) = (m+ rp)1+ sa mod pq,
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where 1 = [1 1]T , r
$←− [0, q), and s $←− [0, pq). We construct c⋆, where c3 = f(c1, c2) for a given linear function
f . We will use f(c1, c2) = 2c1− c2, though we only require f(c1, c2) 6= c1, c2. Therefore, c3 = (m+ rp) + sa3
mod pq, for a3 = 2a1 − a2.
Theorem 4. The encryption scheme produces ciphertexts with components which are random integers mod-
ulo pq.
Note, however, that the components of the ciphertexts are correlated, and this is a vulnerability. We
discuss this later in this section (“Cryptanalysis”).
Decryption
To decrypt, we eliminate s from c (modulo p), giving
Dec(c, sk) = γT c mod p,
where γT = (a2 − a1)−1[a2 − a1]. We call γ the decryption vector.
Addition
We define the addition operation on ciphertexts as the vector sum modulo pq of the two ciphertext vectors
c and c′,
Add(c, c′) = c+ c′ mod pq.
Therefore, if inputs m,m′ encrypt as (m+ rp)1+ sa, (m′ + r′p+)1+ s′a, the sum is:
c+ c′ = (m+m′ + (r + r′)p)1+ (s+ s′)a.
which is a valid encryption of m+m′.
Multiplication
Consider the Hadamard product modulo pq, c⋆ ◦ c′⋆, of the two augmented ciphertext vectors c⋆ and c⋆′:
z⋆ = c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ =

c1c
′
1
c2c
′
2
c3c
′
3

 mod pq
Therefore, if inputs m,m′ are encrypted as (m+ rp)1+ sa, (m′ + r′p)1+ s′a, we first calculate
z⋆ = (m+ rp)(m
′ + r′p)1⋆ + [(m+ rp)s
′ + (m′ + r′p)s]a⋆
+ ss′a◦2⋆ = (mm
′ + r1p)1⋆ + s1a⋆ + ss
′a◦2⋆ mod pq,
where r1 = mr
′ +m′r + rr′p, s1 = (m+ rp)s
′ + (m′ + r′p)s, and a◦2⋆ = [a
2
1 a
2
2 a
2
3]
T .
As we can see, z⋆ is not a valid encryption of mm
′. We need to re-encrypt this product to eliminate the
a◦2⋆ term.
We achieve this by multiplying z⋆ by R, a 2× 3 matrix,[
1− 2α1 α1 α1
−2α2 α2 + 1 α2
]
,
where α1 and α2 are parameters to be decided.
It is easy to check that R1⋆ = 1 and Ra⋆ = a, independently of a1, a2. Now
(Ra◦2⋆ )1 = (1− 2α1)a21 + α1a22 + α1(2a1 − a2)2
= a21 + α1((2a1 − a2)2 + a22 − 2a21)
= a21 + 2α1(a2 − a1)2
(Ra◦2⋆ )2 = −2α2a21 + (α2 + 1)a22 + α2(2a1 − a2)2
= a22 + α2((2a1 − a2)2 + a22 − 2a21)
= a22 + 2α2(a2 − a1)2
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Let β = 2(a2 − a1)2. Thus, β−1 mod pq exists. Therefore, if we set
α1 = β
−1(σa1 + ̺p− a21), α2 = β−1(σa2 + ̺p− a22), (1)
where ̺
$←− [0, q] and σ $←− [0, pq), then we obtain the identity
Ra◦2⋆ = ̺p1+ σa.
Observe that α1, α2 are public, but give only two equations for the four parameters of the system
a1, a2, σ, ̺p. These equations are quadratic mod pq, and solving them is as hard as semiprime factorisa-
tion in the worst case [41].
We re-encrypt by applying R to z⋆, i.e. z
′ = Rz⋆, so
z′ = (mm′ + r1p)R1+ s1Ra+ ss
′Ra◦2
= (mm′ + r1p)1+ s1a+ ss
′(σa + ̺p1)
= (mm′ + r2p)1+ (s1 + σrr
′)a
= (mm′ + r2p)1+ s2a (mod pq)
for some integers r2, s2. So z
′ is a valid encryption of mm′.
Therefore, the homomorphic equivalent of a multiplication operation is defined as
Mult(c, c′) = c · c′ = R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆) (mod pq),
where · is a product on Z2pq and c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ is the Hadamard product modulo pq of the two extended ciphertext
vectors c⋆ and c
′
⋆
. Thus, the public parameters of the system are the modulus pq and the re-encryption
matrix R, i.e. (pq,R).
Observe that, independently of a,
Rc⋆ = (m+ rp)R1⋆ + sRa⋆ = (m+ rp)1+ sa = c,
for any ciphertext c. Hence re-encrypting a ciphertext gives the identity operation, and discloses no inform-
ation.
Hardness
We can show that this system is at least as hard as SPACDP. In fact,
Theorem 5. SPACDP is of equivalent complexity to the special case of HE2 where δ = a2 − a1 (0 < δ < q)
is known.
Observe that, without knowing the parameter k = a2 − a1, HE2 cannot be reduced to SPACDP in this
way. Thus HE2 is seemingly more secure than HE1.
Cryptanalysis
Each new ciphertext c introduces two new unknowns r, s and two equations for c1, c2. Thus we gain no
additional information from a new ciphertext. However, if we can guess, m, m′ for any two ciphertexts c, c′,
we can determine
(c1 −m) = rp+ sa1, (c2 −m) = rp+ sa2,
(c′1 −m′) = r′p+ s′a1, (c′2 −m′) = r′p+ s′a2,
so
(c1 −m)(c′2 −m′)− (c2 −m)(c′1 −m′)
= (a2 − a1)(rs′ − r′s)p (mod pq)
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Since a2 6= a1, and sr′ 6= s′r with high probability, this is a nonzero multiple of p, νp say. We may assume
ν < q, so p = gcd(νp, pq). We can now solve the linear system γT [c c′] = [m m′] mod p to recover the
decryption vector. This effectively breaks the system, since we can now decrypt an arbitrary ciphertext. We
could proceed further, and attempt to infer a1 and a2, but we will not do so.
Note that to break this system, we need to guess two plaintexts, as opposed to one in HE1. The entropy
of a pair (m,m′) is 2ρ, so we have effectively squared the number of guesses needed to break the system
relative to HE1. So HE2 can tolerate somewhat smaller entropy than HE1. We note further that HE2 does
not seem immediately vulnerable to other attacks on HE1 [14, 16, 31].
3.2 Insufficient entropy (HE2N)
In this section we extend HE1N above (section 2.2) to two dimensions. KeyGen chooses p, q and κ according
to the bounds given in section 2.2 and 1, a are as in section 3.1. The secret key is (κ, p,a), and the public
parameters are pq and R, as defined in section 3.1.
We encrypt a plaintext integer m ∈ [0,M) as a 2-vector c,
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp+ sκ)1+ ta mod pq,
where r is as in section 3.1, s
$←− [0, κ), and t $←− [0, pq).
We decrypt a ciphertext c by
Dec(c, sk) = (γT c mod p) mod κ,
where γT is defined as in 3.1.
Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are defined as in section 3.1.
Finally, we note that HE2N satisfies Theorem 3.
4 Generalisation to k dimensions
In this section we generalise HE2 and HE2N to k-vectors. HE1 and HE1N are the cases for k = 1 and HE2
and HE2N are the cases for k = 2.
4.1 Sufficient entropy (HEk)
We now generalise HE2 to k dimensions. KeyGen, randomly chooses p and q according to the bounds given
in section 3.1. KeyGen sets aj
$←− [1, pq)k, ∀j ∈ [1, k − 1]. The secret key, sk, is (p,a1, . . . ,ak−1), and the
public parameters are pq and R. Again, R is detailed below.
With regard to computational overhead, the number of arithmetic operations per plaintext multiplication
is O(k3), and the space requirement per ciphertext is O(k), by comparison with HE1.
Encryption
A plaintext, m ∈ [0,M ], is enciphered as
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp)1+
k−1∑
j=1
sjaj mod pq
where c is a k-vector, r
$←− [0, q), and ∀j, sj $←− [0, pq). Let a0 = 1, and Ak = [a0 a1 . . . ak−1]. We wish the
columns of Ak to form a basis for Zkpq. We will show that they do so with high probability. In the unlikely
event that they do not, we generate new vectors until they do.
Lemma 6. Pr(a0,a1, . . . ,ak−1 do not form a basis) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
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We extend our definition of an augmented vector, v⋆, for a k-vector, v, such that v⋆ is a
(
k+1
2
)
-vector,
with components vi (1 ≤ i ≤ k) followed by 2vi − vj (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k). In general, for ℓ > k, vℓ = 2vi − vj ,
where ℓ =
(
i
2
)
+ k + j − 1. Note that v⋆ = Ukv for a
(
k+1
2
)× k matrix with entries 0,±1, 2, and whose first
k rows form the k× k identity matrix Ik. Note that v⋆ = Ukv implies that 1⋆ is the
(
k+1
2
)
vector of 1’s, and
that ∗ is a linear mapping, i.e. (r1v1 + r2v2)⋆ = r1v1∗ + r2v2∗.
Decryption
Dec(c, sk) = γT c mod p.
where γT = (A−1k )1 is the first row of A
−1
k . We call γ the decryption vector, as in HE2.
Addition
Addition of ciphertexts is the vector sum of the ciphertext vectors as with HE2.
Multiplication
Consider the Hadamard product of two augmented ciphertext vectors, c⋆ ◦ c′⋆. For notational brevity, let
m˜ = m+ rp.
c⋆ ◦ c′⋆ =
(
m˜1⋆ +
k−1∑
j=1
sja⋆j
) ◦ (m˜′1⋆ +
k−1∑
j=1
s′ja⋆j
)
= m˜m˜′1⋆ +
k−1∑
j=1
(m˜s′j + m˜
′sj)a⋆j +
k−1∑
j=1
sjs
′
ja⋆j ◦ a⋆j
+
∑
1≤i<j≤k−1
(sis
′
j + s
′
isj)a⋆i ◦ a⋆j ,
since 1⋆ ◦v⋆ = v⋆ for any v. There are
(
k
2
)
product vectors, which we must eliminate using the re-encryption
matrix, R.
The re-encryption matrix, R, is k × (k+1
2
)
. We require that Rv⋆ = v, for all v.
Lemma 7. Let A⋆k = [a⋆0 a⋆1 . . . a⋆,k−1], where the columns of Ak form a basis for Zkpq. If RA⋆k = Ak,
then Rv⋆ = v for all v ∈ Zkpq.
The condition RA⋆k = Ak can be written more simply, since it is RUkAk = Ak. Postmultiplying by A
−1
k
gives RUk = Ik.
Since RA⋆k = Ak, we have
R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆) = (mm′ + rˆp)1+
k−1∑
j=1
sˆjaj
+
∑
1≤i≤j≤k−1
sˆijR(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j),
where rˆ, sˆj and sˆij (1 ≤ i < j ≤ k − 1) are some integers.
There are k(
(
k+1
2
) − k) = k(k
2
)
undetermined parameters Riℓ, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, k < ℓ ≤
(
k+1
2
)
. We now
determine these by setting
R(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j) = ̺ijp1+
k−1∑
l=1
σijlal (2)
Thus we have k
(
k
2
)
new unknowns, the ̺’s and σ’s, and k
(
k
2
)
linear equations for the k
(
k
2
)
unassigned Riℓ’s.
Let A◦2⋆k be the
(
k+1
2
) × (k+1
2
)
matrix with columns a⋆i ◦ a⋆j (0 ≤ i < j < k), and let Ck be the k ×
(
k
2
)
matrix with columns ̺ijp1+
∑k−1
l=1 σijlal (0 < i < j < k). Then the equations for the Riℓ can be written as
RA◦2⋆k = [Ak | Ck] . (3)
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giving k
(
k+1
2
)
linear equations for the k
(
k+1
2
)
Riℓ’s in terms of quadratic functions of the k(k − 1) aij ’s
(1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ k − 1), which are undetermined. Thus the system has k(k − 1) parameters that cannot
be deduced from R.
The system of equations (3) has a solution provided that A◦2⋆k has an inverse mod pq. We prove that
this is true with high probability. Again, in the unlikely event that this is not true, we generate new vectors
a1, . . . ,ak−1 until it is.
Theorem 8. A◦2⋆k has no inverse mod pq with probability at most (k
2 − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Note that Theorem 8 subsumes Lemma 6, since the first k columns of A◦2⋆k contain Ak as a submatrix,
and must be linearly independent.
Each c introduces k new parameters rp, s1, . . . , sk−1 and k equations, so the number of undetermined
parameters is always k(k − 1).
Cryptanalysis
Note that p can still be determined if we know mi for k ciphertexts. Then let
C = [c1 −m11 . . . ck −mk1], Ak = [1 a1 . . . ak−1]
and let
W =


r1p r2p . . . rkp
s1,1 s2,1 . . . sk,1
...
...
s1,k−1 s2,k−1 . . . sk,k−1

 ,
W ′ =


r1 r2 . . . rk
s1,1 s2,1 . . . sk,1
...
...
s1,k−1 s2,k−1 . . . sk,k−1

 ,
where ri, sij refer to ci. Then C = AkW , and so detC = detAk detW . Note that detW = p detW
′, so detC
is a multiple of p. Now detC can be determined in O(k3) time and, if it is nonzero, p can be determined as
gcd(detC, pq). Then p can be recovered if detC 6= 0.
Lemma 9. Pr(detC = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Once we have recovered p, we can use the known mi to determine the decryption vector γ, by solving
linear equations. Let
C0 = [c1 c2 . . . ck], m
T = [m1 m2 . . . mk].
Lemma 10. Pr(detC0 = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Thus, with high probability, we can solve the system
γTC0 =m
T mod p
uniquely, to recover γ and enable decryption of an arbitrary ciphertext. However, encryption of messages is
not possible, since we gain little information about a1, . . . ,ak. Note also that, if we determined p by some
means other than using k known plaintexts, it is not clear how to recover γ.
To break this system, we need to guess k plaintexts. The entropy of a k-tuple of plaintexts (m1,m2, . . . ,mk)
is kρ, so effectively we need µk guesses, where µ is the number of guesses needed to break HE1. So HEk can
tolerate much smaller entropy than HE1, provided k is large enough. If k is sufficiently large, the scheme
appears secure without adding noise, though it does not have the other advantages of adding noise. We
discuss this further in section 6.
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Fixing an insecurity for k > 2
The decryption vector for HEk is γT = (A−1k )1. Note that γ
T1 = 1 and γTai = 0 (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), since
γTai = I1i (i ∈ [0, k − 1]).
The equations
R(a⋆i ◦ a⋆j) = p̺ij 1+
k−1∑
l=1
σijlal, (4)
define a product · on Zkpq so that c · c′ = R(c⋆ ◦ c′⋆). This product is linear, commutative and distributive,
since R and ⋆ are linear operators, and ◦ is commutative and distributive. So we have an algebra Ak, with
unit element 1 [44]. The ̺ij , σijl (i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1]) are the structure constants of the algebra. In general,
Ak will not be associative, i.e. we can have
R(R(c1⋆ ◦ c2⋆)∗ ◦ c3⋆) = (c1 · c2) · c3
6= c1 · (c2 · c3) = R(c1⋆ ◦R(c2⋆ ◦ c3⋆)∗).
This leads to the following potential insecurity. We must have
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1 · (c2 · c3)) (mod p), (5)
in order to have correct decryption. The associator for Ak is
[ci, cj , cl] = ci · (cj · cl)− (ci · cj) · cl
= rp1+
k−1∑
l=1
sl cl (mod pq).
Thus [ci, cj , cl] is an encryption of 0. If we can find k such associators from c1, . . . , cn which violate (5),
then with high probability we will have k linearly independent associators. We can use use these to make
a collision attack on HEk, in a similar way to that described in section 2.1. We use the gcd method to
determine p, and then γ, as described in section 4.1. In fact all we need is that (5) holds for any associator.
That is, for all c1, c2, c3, we need
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1(·c2 · c3)) (mod pq),
or, equivalently, using the CRT,
γT ((c1 · c2) · c3) = γT (c1 · (c2 · c3)) (mod q). (6)
By linearity, it follows that (6) holds if and only if it holds for all basis elements, excluding the identity.
That is, for all i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1], we need
γT (ai · (aj · al)) = γT ((ai · aj) · al) (mod q). (7)
The associator for Ak is
[ai,aj ,al] = ai · (aj · al)− (ai · aj) · al
= rp1+
k−1∑
l=1
slal (mod pq),
for some integers r, s1, . . . , sk−1, and so γ
T [ai,aj ,al] = rp.
If Ak is associative, the problem does not arise, since (7) will be satisfied automatically. Associativity
holds for k ≤ 2, since all we have to check is that a · (a · a) = (a · a) · a, which is true by commutativity.
Thus HEk with k ≤ 2 cannot be attacked in this way.
Requiring associativity in Ak would overconstrain the system, since it imposes k
(
k+1
2
)
equations on the
k
(
k+1
2
)
structure constants. We have only k(k − 1) undetermined parameters, so this is too much. But all
we need is that (7) holds. We have the following.
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Lemma 11. (7) holds if and only if
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it =
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt (mod q), ∀i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1].
There are several ways to ensure that (7) holds. We will do so by giving the ̺ij a multiplicative structure.
Lemma 12. Let τ, ̺i
$←− [0, q) (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), let ̺ij = ̺i̺j mod q, and let the σijl satisfy
∑k−1
l=1 σijl ̺l =
τ̺i̺j (mod q) for all i, j ∈ [1, k− 1]. Then, for all i, j, ℓ ∈ [1, k− 1], γT (ai · (aj ·al)) = τ̺i̺j̺l mod q, the
symmetry of which implies that (7) holds.
Thus the conditions of Lemma 12 are sufficient to remove the insecurity. The price is that we now
have (k − 1)(k
2
)
+ (k − 1) + k(k − 1) = (k + 1)(k
2
)
+ k − 1 parameters and k(k
2
)
equations. There are(
k
2
)
+ (k − 1) = (k + 2)(k − 1)/2 independent parameters. This is fewer than the original k(k − 1), but
remains Ω(k2).
4.2 Insufficient entropy (HEkN)
In this section, we generalise HE2N to k dimensions. KeyGen, randomly chooses κ, p and q according to
the bounds given in section 3.2. ∀j, KeyGen sets aj as in 4.1. The secret key, sk, is (κ, p, a1, . . ., ak−1),
and the public parameters are pq and R. R is as given in section 4.1. Note that, as a result of adding the
“noise” term, defence against non-associativity is not required.
A plaintext, m ∈ [0,M ], is enciphered as
Enc(m, sk) = c = (m+ rp+ sκ)1+
k−1∑
j=1
tjaj (mod pq)
where r, s are as in section 3.2, and tj
$←− [0, pq) ∀j ∈ [1, k).
A ciphertext is deciphered by,
Dec(c, sk) = (γT c mod p) mod κ.
where γT is defined as in section 4.1.
Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts are as in section 4.1.
The effective entropy of HEkN is ρ′ = k(ρ+ lg κ). Thus, as we increase k, the “noise” term can be made
smaller while still providing the requisite level of entropy.
Clearly HEkN also inherits the conclusions of Theorem 3.
5 An extension of HE2N using the CRT (HE2NCRT)
As an interesting aside, we extend HE2N (section 3.2) using a technique inspired by CRT secret sharing, so
that we compute the final result modulo a product of primes
∏K
j=1 pj rather than modulo p, where K is the
number of primes.
In this scheme, we distribute the computation. We have K processors. Each processor computes arith-
metic on ciphertexts modulo pjqj , where pj , qj are suitable primes. Also, each processor only receives the
jth ciphertext vector of an integer. Addition and multiplication of ciphertexts is as defined in section 3.1,
except that it is performed modulo pjqj .
This serves two purposes. The first is to be able to handle larger moduli by dividing the computation into
subcomputations on smaller moduli. The second is to mitigate against exposure of the secret key p in the
system presented in section 3.2, by not distributing the modulus pq to each processor. Instead, we distribute
pjqj to the jth processor, for j ∈ [1,K]. This allows us to partition the computation into subcomputations,
encrypted using different parameters. Thus, should an attacker compromise one subcomputation, they may
gain no knowledge of other subcomputations.
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Key Generation
KeyGen, randomly chooses κ as in section 2.2. For all j ∈ [1,K], it randomly chooses a prime pj such that
pj satisfies 2
λ−1 < pj < 2
λ and
Π =
K∏
j=1
pj > (n+ 1)
d(M + κ2)d.
It also randomly chooses qj , j ∈ [1,K], as for q in section 2.1. Finally, it sets aj = [aj1 aj2]T , where
ajk
$←− [1, pjqj) (j ∈ [1,K], k ∈ [1, 2]) such that aj1 6= aj2 mod p and aj1 6= aj2 mod q. The secret key,
sk, is (κ, p1, . . . , pK ,a1, . . . ,aK), and the public parameters are pjqj (j ∈ [1,K]) and Rj (j ∈ [1,K]), where
each Rj is defined as R in section 3.1.
Encryption
We encrypt an integer, mi (i ∈ [1, n]), as the set of K 2-vectors, cij ,
cij = (mi + rijpj + siκ)1+ tijaj mod pjqj (j ∈ [1,K]),
where rij
$←− [0, qj), si $←− [0, κ), and tij $←− [0, pjqj) (i ∈ [1, n], j ∈ [1,K]).
Decryption
To decrypt, we first decrypt the jth ciphertext of the computational result cj as in section 3.1, to give
Pj = γ
T
j cj mod pj,
where Pj is the residue of P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn, κ) mod pj and γ
T
j = (aj2 − aj1)−1[aj2 − aj1].
We then use the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute the plaintext as
P (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) =
( K∑
j=1
PjMjµj mod Π
)
mod κ,
where Mj = Π/pj and µj =M
−1
j mod pj.
Addition and Multiplication
Addition of ciphertexts is performed as in 3.1. Multiplication of ciphertexts on processor j is now
Mult(cj , c
′
j) = Rj(cj⋆ ◦ c′j⋆).
Clearly HEkN could be extended to HEkNCRT in a similar way, but we will not discuss the details here.
6 Fully Homomorphic System
We return to HEk, presented above in section 4.1. We will show that, for large enough k, this can be used
to create an FHE system.
We may use HEk to evaluate an arithmetic circuit homomorphically, where R = Zpq. However, this
system is only somewhat homomorphic. If the computational result grows larger than p, we are unable to
successfully decrypt it. This restricts us to arithmetic circuits of bounded depth to avoid the blow up. To
make it fully homomorphic, we consider Boolean circuits.
Typically, we will use the binary Boolean functions, AND, OR, and NOT in the Boolean circuit. However,
we may use fewer functions. Any Boolean circuit may be represented using only NAND gates [45]. Recall
that the indegree of any gate in the circuit is always 2, but the outdegree is arbitrary. The inputs to each
gate are bits, as are the outputs. We will denote the set of inputs to the circuit by I ⊆ V , and the set
of outputs by O ⊆ V . The inputs have indegree 0, and the outputs have outdegree 0, but we regard the
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inputs as having indegree 1, and the outputs as having outdegree 1, with wires from and to the external
environment Λ.
Note that constant input bits can easily be eliminated from the circuit, so we assume there are none, to
avoid an obvious KPA. Even so, if we represent the bit values 0, 1 by encrypting known constants α0, α1, the
HEk system is open to a simple KPA. For any ciphertext c, we can compute c′ = (c−α01) · (c−α11). Then
c′ is an encryption of 0. By repeating this on k ciphertexts, we can obtain k linearly independent encryptions
of zero with high probability. Once we have done this, we can determine p and γ as in section 4.1. The
problem, of course, is that we have not increased the entropy of the input data.
Therefore, we must add noise to the ciphertexts, but we will do this so as to ensure that the noise does
not grow with the the depth of the circuit. On each wire e ∈ E, we will represent the bit value be ∈ {0, 1} by
we ∈ {ω0e, ω1e}, where ω0e = 2s0,e, ω1e = 1 + 2s1,e, where s0,e, s0,e $←− [0, κ). Thus be = we mod 2, and the
noise has entropy lg κ. The value of κ is chosen as large as possible such that we can correctly evaluate any
polynomial of degree 2 in two variables. For each input i ∈ I, we represent the input bit value bi similarly,
by xi ∈ {ω0i, ω1i}. The inputs and the wires in the circuit are encrypted using HEk, the inputs directly and
the other wires indirectly as described below. As discussed in section 4.1, we need k known plaintexts to
break HEk. The plaintexts are the encrypted bits we mod 2, so a brute force attack requires guessing at
least 2k bits. So, by setting k ≫ logλ, a brute force attack on the system requires time superpolynomial in
the security parameter λ.
An input i ∈ I has a wire (Λ, i) on which the (encrypted) input value xi is stored. For any wire e = (i, v)
from input i, we have a linear function L(x) = a+ bx, which converts the plaintext input value x ∈ {α0, α1}
to the wire value w ∈ {γ0, γ1}. (We suppress the wire labels e when they are clear from the context.) This
requires
a = (α1 − α0)−1(α1γ0 − α0γ1), b = (α1 − α0)−1(γ1 − γ0).
The encrypted coefficients of this function are stored as data for the wire e. Note that all computations are
mod pq, and the required inverses exist because the numbers involved are less than κ.
For each output wire e = (v, v′) of a NAND gate v, we have a quadratic functionQ(x, y) = a+bx+cy+dxy,
which converts the values on the input wires of the gate, x ∈ {α0, α1}, y ∈ {β0, β1}, to the wire value
w ∈ {γ0, γ1}. This requires
a = γ0 + α1β1ϑ, b = −β1ϑ, c = −α1ϑ, d = ϑ,
where ϑ =
(
(α1 − α0)(β1 − β0)
)−1
(γ1 − γ0). Again, the encrypted coefficients of this function are stored as
data for the wire e.
For each output gate v ∈ O, we decrypt the value w ∈ {γ0, γ1} computed by its (unique) output wire
(v,Λ). Then the output bit is w mod 2.
Thus we replace the logical operations of the Boolean circuit by evaluation of low degree polynomials.
For simplicity, we have chosen to use only NAND gates, but we can represent any binary Boolean function
by a quadratic polynomial in the way described above. Since the quadratic polynomials are encrypted in
our system, they conceal the binary Boolean function they represent. Thus the circuit can be “garbled” [5,
25], to minimise inference about the inputs and outputs of the circuit from its structure.
However, there is a price to be paid for controlling the noise. The encrypted circuit is not securely
reusable with the same values ω0e, ω1e for we. Suppose we can observe the encrypted value on wire e three
times giving cyphertexts c1, c2, c3. Two of these are encryptions of the same value 2s0,e or 1 + 2s1,e. Thus
(c1 − c2) · (c1 − c3) · (c2 − c3) is an encryption of 0. By doing this for k wires, we can break the system.
This is essentially the collision attack described in section 2.
Some reuse of the encrypted circuit is possible by using multiple values on the wires, and higher degree
polynomials for the gates. However, we will not consider this refinement, since the idea seems to have little
practical interest.
7 Experimental Results
HE1, HE1N, HE2, and HE2N have been implemented in pure unoptimised Java using the JScience math-
ematics library [19]. Secure pseudo-random numbers are generated using the ISAAC algorithm [33]. The
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Alg. Parameters Encryption MR Job Decrypt(ms)
d ρ ρ′ Init(s) Enc(µs) Exec(s) Prod(µs) Sum(µs)
HE1 2 32 n/a 0.12 13.52 23.82 54.41 9.06 0.21
HE1 2 64 n/a 0.12 16.24 23.85 60.38 8.04 0.49
HE1 2 128 n/a 0.15 25.73 23.77 84.69 8.43 0.28
HE1 3 32 n/a 0.17 22.98 23.65 87.75 11.46 0.35
HE1 3 64 n/a 0.19 34.63 24.72 95.68 12.37 0.45
HE1 3 128 n/a 0.42 54.83 26.05 196.71 14.07 0.55
HE1 4 32 n/a 0.28 43.36 24.48 108.72 13.75 0.5
HE1 4 64 n/a 0.53 58.85 26.41 227.44 15.85 3.59
HE1 4 128 n/a 1.36 104.95 28.33 484.95 16.92 5.67
HE1N 2 1 32 0.22 32.99 22.94 88.38 8.53 3.35
HE1N 2 1 64 0.39 52.63 26.24 168.54 12.39 3.56
HE1N 2 1 128 1.2 89.01 26.18 226.2 13.16 8.1
HE1N 2 8 32 0.6 57.88 25.9 177.36 11.17 7.18
HE1N 2 8 64 0.32 43.93 26.53 96.78 12.18 2.27
HE1N 2 8 128 1.13 78.11 24.42 212.75 11.07 8.4
HE1N 2 16 64 0.33 53.97 27.15 168 13.67 4.47
HE1N 2 16 128 0.63 68.73 25.22 194.42 11.01 7.65
HE1N 3 1 32 8.54 183.19 24.24 522.07 12.06 9.09
HE1N 3 1 64 3.67 125 29.49 467.36 18.22 11.43
HE1N 3 1 128 27.84 313.76 26.94 1235.77 15.04 11.75
HE1N 3 8 32 115 462.45 32.61 1556.17 21.11 19.79
HE1N 3 8 64 9.75 180.08 25.87 500.62 15.03 10.39
HE1N 3 8 128 36.05 259.15 30.1 836.27 20.68 11.45
HE1N 3 16 64 30.96 378.99 28.24 1338.33 15.51 13.3
HE1N 3 16 128 8.13 226.32 27.92 621.95 18.01 10.89
HE2 2 32 n/a 0.16 85.79 26.82 305.52 11.68 4.83
HE2 2 64 n/a 0.17 95.92 29.71 354.79 16.9 3.26
HE2 2 128 n/a 0.22 132.53 32.84 540.78 22.83 4.92
HE2 3 32 n/a 0.23 130.3 31.18 513.93 23.77 6.52
HE2 3 64 n/a 0.29 145.62 32.84 615.9 24.61 6.3
HE2 3 128 n/a 0.52 249.47 29.54 1443.82 16.56 18.34
HE2 4 32 n/a 0.39 175.63 29.5 733.23 20.69 6.01
HE2 4 64 n/a 0.7 255.3 29.55 1578.39 18.29 16.24
HE2 4 128 n/a 2.7 465.51 37.47 2943.91 22.15 15.41
HE2N 2 1 32 0.27 147.83 29.74 571.94 16.58 5.66
HE2N 2 1 64 0.43 202.74 33.36 1291.68 18.3 13.23
HE2N 2 1 128 1.58 354.19 33.76 1977.51 17.13 12.46
HE2N 2 8 32 0.59 234.83 31.42 1413.31 15.21 14.92
HE2N 2 8 64 0.33 163.78 27.42 635.64 13.6 6.18
HE2N 2 8 128 0.9 307.68 36.32 1850.83 21.71 15.79
HE2N 2 16 64 0.42 208.1 29.96 1230.56 13.41 13.16
HE2N 2 16 128 0.73 274.48 30.82 1585.1 14.85 15.04
HE2N 3 1 32 5.72 651.1 36.49 3438.96 18.67 19.05
HE2N 3 1 64 4.45 477.52 35.33 3073.46 18.75 19.77
HE2N 3 1 128 26.83 1192.79 43.23 6416.43 22.48 25.12
HE2N 3 8 32 87.38 1658.36 49.63 8139.19 23.71 27.24
HE2N 3 8 64 5.21 607.75 36.54 3337.1 22.28 17.39
HE2N 3 8 128 17.14 945.64 40.49 4620.69 25.91 22.41
HE2N 3 16 64 39.19 1368.18 44.88 7005.7 24.1 28.3
HE2N 3 16 128 11.39 774.07 36.05 3845.1 20.29 20.74
Table 1: Timings for each experimental configuration. Init is the initialisation time for the encryption
algorithm, Enc is the mean time to encrypt a single integer, Exec is the MR job execution time, Prod is the
mean time to homomorphically compute the product of two encrypted integers, Sum is the mean time to
homomorphically compute the sum of two encrypted integers.
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ISAAC cipher is seeded using the Linux /dev/random source. This prevents the weakness in ISAAC shown
by Aumasson [1].
We devised a simple evaluation experiment to generate a fixed (24,000) number of encrypted inputs and
then perform a homomorphic inner product on those inputs using a Hadoop MapReduce (MR) algorithm.
On the secure client side, the MR input is generated as pseudo-random ρ-bit integers which are encrypted
and written to a file with d inputs per line, where d is the degree of the polynomial to be computed. In
addition, the unencrypted result of the computation is computed so that it may checked against the decrypted
result of the homomorphic computation. On the Hadoop cluster side, each mapper processes a line of input
by homomorphically multiplying together each input on a line and outputs this product. A single reducer
homomorphically sums these products. The MR algorithm divides the input file so that each mapper receives
an equal number of lines of input, thereby ensuring maximum parallelisation. Finally, on the secure client
side, the MR output is decrypted.
Our test environment consisted of a single secure client (an Ubuntu Linux VM with 16GB RAM) and
a Hadoop 2.7.3 cluster running in a heterogeneous OpenNebula cloud. The Hadoop cluster consisted of
17 Linux VMs, one master and 16 slaves, each allocated 2GB of RAM. Each experimental configuration of
algorithm, polynomial degree (d), integer size (ρ), and effective entropy of inputs after adding “noise” (ρ′,
for the ‘N’ variant algorithms only), was executed 10 times. The mean results are tabulated in Table 1.
Our results compare extremely favourably with Table 2 of [36]. For encryption, our results are, in
the best case, 1000 times faster than those presented there, and, in the worst case, 10 times faster. For
decryption, our results are comparable. However, to decrypt our results we take the modulus modulo a
large primes rather than 2 as in the case of [36]. This is obviously less efficient. For homomorphic sums
and products, our algorithms perform approximately 100 times faster. [36] only provides experimental data
for computing degree 2 polynomials. We have provided experimental results for the computation of higher
degree polynomials.
Similarly, compared with figure 13 of [40], our encryption times for a 32-bit integer are considerably
faster. While a time for computing a homomorphic sum on a column is given in figure 12, it is unclear how
many rows exist in their test database. Nevertheless, our results for computing homomorphic sums compare
favourably with those given. It should be noted that CryptDB [40] only supports homomorphic sums and is
incapable of computing an inner product. Therefore, we only compare the homomorphic sum timings.
Table 1 of [46] is unclear on whether the values are aggregate timings or the timing per operation. Even
assuming that they are aggregate values, our results are approximately 100 times faster than those presented
for homomorphic sum and product operations. We also note that Crypsis [46] uses two different encryption
schemes for integers, ElGamal [23] and Paillier [39], which only support addition or multiplication but not
both. No discussion of computation of an inner product is made in [46] but we expect that the timings would
be considerably worse as data encrypted using ElGamal to compute the products would have to be shipped
back to the secure client to be re-encrypted using Paillier so that the final inner product could be computed.
We note that there are some apparent anomalies in the data. JScience implements arbitrary precision
integers as an array of Java long (64-bit) integers to store the bit representation of an integer. It may be
the case that this underlying representation is optimal for some of our test configurations and suboptimal
for others, causing unexpected results. Another possibility is that the unexpected results may be as a
result of JVM heap increases and garbage collection which may have been more prevalent in certain test
configurations.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented several new homomorphic encryption schemes intended for use in a practical
SSCC system. We envisage that the majority of computation on integer big data, outside of scientific com-
puting, will be computing low degree polynomials on integers, or fixed-point decimals which can be converted
to integers. Our somewhat homomorphic schemes are perfectly suited to these types of computation.
As they are only somewhat homomorphic, each of these schemes has a concern that the computational
result will grow bigger than the secret modulus. In the case of the “noise” variants, we also have to consider
the noise term growing large. So, as they stand, these schemes can only compute polynomials of suitably
bounded degree.
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A further concern is that the ciphertext space is much larger than the plaintext space. This is as a
result of adding multiples of large primes to the plaintext. However, we have shown that values exist which
would make the system practical for computing low degree polynomials. Similar schemes [18, 20] produce
ciphertexts infeasibly larger than the corresponding plaintext, which is a single bit. For example, it should be
noted, that even the practical CryptDB [40], which is not fully homomorphic, enciphers a 32-bit integer as a
2048-bit ciphertext. Our schemes will produce ciphertext of similar size, if high security is required. However,
if the security is only intended to prevent casual snooping, rather than a determined cryptographic attack,
the ciphertext size can be reduced, and the blow-up may be acceptable. Observe that the parameters of the
system will change for each computation, so a sustained attack has constantly to re-learn these parameters.
Of course, if the attacker is able to export data for off-line cryptanalysis, only high security suffices.
We have also presented a hierarchy of systems, HEk, with increasing levels of security. These seem to be
of practical interest for small k > 2, but seem impractical for large k.
Finally, we presented a fully homomorphic scheme based on HEk for large enough k, which seems of
purely theoretical interest. The scheme is capable of computing an arbitrary depth Boolean circuit without
employing the techniques used in other fully homomorphic systems [10, 13, 24].
We have implemented and evaluated the HE1, HE1N, HE2 and HE2N schemes as part of an SSCC system
as discussed in section 7. Our results are extremely favourable when compared with [36, 40, 46]. So much
so, that our MapReduce job execution times remain low even when using the largest set of parameters for
HE2N. We believe that this demonstrates the suitability of our schemes for the encryption of integers in
cloud computations.
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A Proofs
Theorem 1. An attack against HE1 is successful in polynomial time if and only if we can factorise a distinct
semi-prime in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that we have an unknown plaintext m, encrypted as c = m+ rp mod pq, where r
$←− [1, q).
If we can factor pq in polynomial time, we can determine p and q in polynomial time, since we know
p < q. Therefore, we can determine m = c mod p.
If we can determine m given c for arbitrary m, then we can determine rp = c−m. We are given qp, and
we know 0 < r < q, so gcd(rp, qp) must be p, and we can compute p in polynomial time. Now, given p, we
can determine q as qp/p. Hence, we can factorise pq in polynomial time.
Lemma 2. If the inputsm have entropy ρ then, for any two independent inputsm1,m2, Pr(m1 = m2) ≤ 2−ρ.
Proof. Pr(m1 = m2) =
∑M−1
i=0 ξ
2
i = 2
−H2 ≤ 2−ρ, since H2 ≥ H∞ = ρ.
Theorem 3. For any encryption c, c mod κ is polynomial time indistinguishable from the uniform distri-
bution on [0, κ). Thus HE1 satisfies IND-CPA, under the assuption that SPACDP is not polynomial time
solvable.
Proof.
c = m+ sκ+ rp = m+ rp mod κ,
where r
$←− [1, q). Thus, for i ∈ [0, κ),
Pr
(
c mod κ = i) = Pr(m+ rp = i mod κ
)
= Pr
(
r = p−1(i −m) mod κ)
∈ {⌊q/κ⌋1/q, ⌈q/κ⌉1/q}
∈ [1/κ− 1/q, 1/κ+ 1/q],
where the inverse p−1 of p mod κ exists since p is a prime. Hence the total variation distance from the
uniform distribution is
1
2
κ−1∑
i=0
|Pr (c mod κ = i)− 1/κ| < κ/q.
This is exponentially small in the security parameter λ of the system, so the distribution of c mod κ cannot
be distinguished in polynomial time from the uniform distribution. Note further that c1 mod κ, c2 mod κ
are independent for any two ciphertexts ci = mi + siκ+ rip (i = 1, 2), since r1, r2 are independent.
To show IND-CPA, suppose now that known plaintexts µ1, . . . , µn are encrypted by an oracle for HE1N,
giving ciphertexts c1, . . . , cn. Then, for ri
$←− [0, q), si $←− [0, κ), we have an SPACDP with ciphertexts
ci = mi + siκ + rip, and the approximate divisor p cannot be determined in polynomial time in the worst
case. However, the offsets in this SPACDP are all of the form µi + siκ, for known mi, and we must make
sure this does not provide information about p. To show this, we rewrite the SPACDP as
ci = µi + siκ+ rip = µ
′
i + s
′
iκ, (i = 1, 2, . . . , n), (8)
where s′i = si + ⌊(mi + rip)/κ⌋, and µ′i = µi + rip (mod κ). Now we may view (8) as an ACDP, with
“encryptions” µ′i of the µi, and approximate divisor κ. Since ACDP is at least as hard as SPACDP, and
the offsets µ′i are polynomial time indistinguishable from uniform [0, κ), from above, we will not be able to
determine κ in polynomial time. Now, the offsets m′1,m
′
2 of any two plaintexts m1,m2 are polynomial time
indistinguishable from m′2,m
′
1, since they are indistinguishable from two independent samples from uniform
[0, κ). Therefore, in polynomial time, we will not be able to distinguish between the encryption c1 of m1
and the encryption c2 of m2.
Theorem 4. The encryption scheme produces ciphertexts with components which are random integers mod-
ulo pq.
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Proof. Consider a ciphertext vector which encrypts the plaintext, m, and the expressionm+rp+sa mod pq
which represents one of its elements. Then r
$←− [0, q), s $←− [0, pq).
Consider first m + sa. We know that a−1 mod pq exists because a 6= 0 (mod p and mod q). Thus,
conditional on r,
Pr[m+ rp+ sa = i mod pq] =
Pr[s = a−1(i−m− rp) mod pq] = 1
pq
.
Since this holds for any i ∈ [0, pq), m+ ra+ sp mod pq is a uniformly random integer from [0, pq).
Theorem 5. SPACDP is of equivalent complexity to the special case of HE2 where δ = a2 − a1 (0 < δ < q)
is known.
Proof. Suppose we have a system of n approximate prime multiples, mi + rip (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Then we
generate values a, s1, s2, . . . , sn
$←− [0, pq), and we have an oracle set up the cryptosystem with a1 = a,
a2 = a+ δ. The oracle has access to p and provides us with R, but no information about its choice of ̺ and
σ. We then generate the ciphertexts ci (i = 1, 2, . . . , n):
[
ci1
ci2
]
=
[
mi + rip+ sia
mi + rip+ si(a+ δ)
]
(mod pq). (9)
Thus ci1 − sia = ci2 − si(a+ δ) = mi + rip. Thus finding the mi in (9) in polynomial time solves SPACDP
in polynomial time.
Conversely, suppose we have any HE2 system with a2 = a1 + δ. The ciphertext for mi (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) is
as in (9). so si = δ
−1(ci2 − ci1). Since 0 < δ < q < p, δ is coprime to both p and q, and hence δ−1 mod pq
exists. Thus breaking the system is equivalent to determining the mi mod p from mi+ δ
−1(ci2− ci1)a+ rip
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n). Determining the mi + δ
−1(ci2 − ci1)a from the mi + δ−1(ci2 − ci1)a + rip (i = 1, 2, . . . , n)
can be done using SPACDP. However, we still need to determine a in order to to determine mi. This can
be done by “deciphering” R using SPACDP. We have
2δ2α1 = σa− a2 + ̺p, 2δ2α2 = σ(a+ δ)− (a+ δ)2 + ̺p,
so σ = 2δ2(α2−α1)− 2ka− δ2. Now a can be determined by first determining m0 = a(2δ2(α2−α1)− (2δ+
1)a− δ2) from m0+̺p = 2δ2α1. This can be done using SPACDP. Then a can be determined by solving the
quadratic equation m0 = a(2δ
2(α2 − α1)− (2δ + 1)a− δ2) mod p for a. This can be done probabilistically
in polynomial time using, for example, the algorithm of Berlekamp [7]. So the case a = [a a + δ]T , with
known δ, can be attacked using SPACDP on the system
m0 + ̺p, m1 + δ
−1(c11 − c12)a+ r1p,
. . . , mn + δ
−1(cn1 − cn2)a+ rnp.
Lemma 6. Pr(a0,a1, . . . ,ak−1 do not form a basis) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. The a’s are a basis if A−1k exists, since then v = Akr when r = A
−1
k v, for any v. Now A
−1
k exists
mod pq if (detAk)
−1 mod pq exists, by constructing the adjugate of Ak. Now (detAk)
−1 mod pq exists
if detAk 6= 0 mod p and detAk 6= 0 mod q. Now detAk is a polynomial of total degree (k − 1) in the
aij (0 < i ≤ k, 0 < j < k), and is not identically zero, since detAk = 1 if ai = ei+1 (1 < i < k). Also
aij
$←− [0, pq) implies aij mod p $←− [0, p) and aij mod q $←− [0, q). Hence, using the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma
(SZL) [38], we have Pr(detAk = 0 mod p) ≤ (k− 1)/p and Pr(detAk = 0 mod q) ≤ (k− 1)/q, and it follows
that Pr(∄ (detAk)
−1 mod pq) ≤ (k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Lemma 7. Let A⋆k = [a⋆0 a⋆1 . . . a⋆,k−1], where the columns of Ak form a basis for Zkpq. If RA⋆k = Ak,
then Rv⋆ = v for all v ∈ Zkpq.
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Proof. We have v = Akr for some r ∈ Zkpq. Then A⋆k = UkAk and v⋆k = Ukv, so Rv⋆ = RUkv =
RUkAkr = RA⋆kr = Akr = v.
Theorem 8. A◦2⋆k has no inverse mod pq with probability at most (k
2 − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. We use the same approach as in Lemma 6. Thus A◦2⋆k is invertible provided detA
◦2
⋆k 6= 0 mod p and
detA◦2⋆k 6= 0 mod q. Let A denote the vector of aij ’s, (aij : 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j < k). The elements of A◦2⋆k are
quadratic polynomials over A, except for the first column, which has all 1’s, and columns 2, 3, . . . , k which
are linear polynomials. So detA◦2⋆k is a polynomial over A of total degree 2
(
k
2
)
+k− 1 = k2− 1. Thus, unless
detA◦2⋆k is identically zero as a polynomial overA, the SZL [38] implies Pr(∄ (detA
◦2
⋆k)
−1 mod p) ≤ (k2−1)/p
and Pr(∄ (detA◦2⋆k)
−1 mod q) ≤ (k2−1)/q. Therefore we have Pr(∄ (detA◦2⋆k)−1 mod pq) ≤ (k2−1)(1/p+1/q).
It remains to prove that detA◦2⋆k is not identically zero as a polynomial over A in either Zp or Zq. We
prove this by induction on k. Consider Zp, the argument for Zq being identical. Since Zp is a field, detA◦2⋆k
is identically zero if and only if it has rank less than
(
k+1
2
)
for all A. That is, there exist λij(A) ∈ Zp
(0 ≤ i ≤ j < k), not all zero, so that
L(A) =
k−1∑
0≤i≤j
λija⋆i ◦ a⋆j
= α+ a⋆,k−1 ◦ β + λk−1,k−1a◦2⋆,k−1 = 0,
where α =
∑k−2
0≤i≤j λija⋆i ◦ a⋆j and β =
∑k−2
i=0 λi,k−1a⋆i are independent of a⋆,k−1.
Clearly λk−1,k−1 = 0. Otherwise, whatever α,β, we can choose values for ak so that L 6= 0, a contra-
diction. Now suppose λi,k−1 6= 0 for some 0 ≤ i < k − 1. The matrix Aˆ⋆ with columns a⋆i (0 ≤ i < k − 1)
contains Ak−1 as a submatrix, which has rank (k − 1) with high probability by Lemma 6. Thus β 6= 0 and,
whatever α, we can choose values for ak so that L 6= 0. Thus λi,k−1 = 0 for all 0 ≤ i < k. Thus λij 6= 0 for
some 0 ≤ i ≤ j < k− 1. Now the matrix Aˆ◦2⋆ with
(
k
2
)
columns a⋆i ◦a⋆j (0 ≤ i ≤ j < k− 1) contains A◦2⋆,k−1
as a submatrix, and therefore has rank
(
k
2
)
by induction. Hence α 6= 0, implying L 6= 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 9. Pr(detC = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. From Lemma 6, detA = 0 mod p or detA = 0 mod q with probability at most (k− 1)(1/p+1/q).
So detA is not zero or a divisor of zero mod pq. The entries of W ′ are random [0, pq), and detW ′ is a
polynomial of total degree k in its entries. It is a nonzero polynomial, since W ′ = Ik is possible. Hence,
using the SZL [38], Pr(detW ′ = 0 mod p) ≤ k/p and Pr(detW ′ = 0 mod q) ≤ k/q. So detW ′ is zero or a
divisor of zero mod pq with probability at most k(1/p+ 1/q). So detAdetW ′ = 0 mod pq with probability
at most (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q). So detC 6= 0 with high probability.
Lemma 10. Pr(detC0 = 0 mod pq) ≤ (2k − 1)(1/p+ 1/q).
Proof. Note that C0 = C if m1 = m2 = · · · = mk = 0. Since Lemma 9 holds in that case, the result
follows.
Lemma 11. (7) holds if and only if
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it =
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt (mod q), ∀i, j, l ∈ [1, k − 1].
Proof. Since γT1 = 1 and γTai = 0, i ∈ [1, k − 1], γT (ai · aj) = γT
(
p̺ij 1+
∑k−1
l=1 σijlal
)
= p̺ij . Thus
ai · (aj · al) = ai ·
(
p̺jl1+
∑k−1
t=1 σjltat
)
= p̺jlai +
∑k−1
t=1 σjltai · at,
and hence γT [ai · (aj · al)] = p
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it. Similarly γ
T [(ai · aj) · al] = p
∑k−1
t=1 σijt̺lt, and the lemma
follows.
25
Lemma 12. Let τ, ̺i
$←− [0, q) (i ∈ [1, k − 1]), let ̺ij = ̺i̺j mod q, and let the σijl satisfy
∑k−1
l=1 σijl ̺l =
τ̺i̺j (mod q) for all i, j ∈ [1, k− 1]. Then, for all i, j, ℓ ∈ [1, k− 1], γT (ai · (aj ·al)) = τ̺i̺j̺l mod q, the
symmetry of which implies that (7) holds.
Proof. We have γT (aj · al) = p̺ij = p̺j̺l for all j, ℓ ∈ [1, k − 1]. Hence, mod q,
γT (ai · (aj · al)) = p
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺it
= p
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺i̺t
= p̺i
∑k−1
t=1 σjlt̺t
= p̺iτ̺j̺l = pτ̺i̺j̺l.
B Derivation of bounds
To recap, n is the number of inputs, M is an exclusive upper bound on the inputs, d is the degree of the
polynomial we wish to calculate. We take p ≈ 2λ and then q ≈ 2η, where η = λ2/ρ − λ, to guard against
the attacks of [16, 31].
For HE1, we assume M ≈ 2ρ, n ≤ √M . Therefore,
p > (n+ 1)dMd ≈ (nM)d for large n.
So, we may take
p = 2λ > M3d/2 ≈ 23dρ/2
i.e. λ ≈ 3dρ/2
and η ≈ λ
2
ρ
− λ = 3dλ
2
− λ = 3dρ
2
(
3d
2
− 1
)
For HE1N, we assume M ≈ 2ρ, and we have ρ′ = ρ+ lg κ. Now,
κ > (n+ 1)dMd ≈ (nM)d for large n,
i.e. lg κ ≈ d(lg n+ ρ)
Therefore, since ρ = ρ′ − lg κ,
lg κ > d lg n+ d(ρ′ − lg κ)
i.e. lg κ ≈ d(lg n+ ρ
′)
d+ 1
Since κ is much larger than M , we also have
p = 2λ > (n+ 1)d(M + κ2)d ≈ (nκ2)d for large n
i.e. λ ≈ d(lg n+ 2 lg κ),
and η ≈ λ
2
ρ′
− λ = 3dλ
2
− λ = 3dρ
′
2
(
3d
2
− 1
)
Then we can calculate η as for HE1 above. Note that, in both HE1 and HE1N, λ scales linearly with d, and
η scales quadratically.
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